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Abstract—We consider an online ad network problem in
which an ad exchange auctions ad slots and intermediaries
called demand side platforms (DSPs) buy these ad slots for
their clients (advertisers). An intermediary represents multiple
advertisers. Different types of ad slots are auctioned by the
ad exchange, e.g., video ad, banner ad etc. We study repeated
posted price auctions for homogeneous and heterogeneous items
when there is an intermediary. In a posted price auction, the
auctioneer sets a fixed reserve price. The buyer can accept the
price and win the ad slot or reject the price.
We analyze the system from the auctioneer’s perspective and
show that the optimal reserve price is dynamic for heteroge-
neous items. We also investigate system from intermediary’s
perspective and devise algorithms for scheduling advertisers.
Often the advertisers have budget constraints and impression
constraints. We formulate a revenue optimization problem at
the intermediary and also consider the problem of scheduling
advertisers with budget and impression constraints. Finally, we
present a numerical study for the single seller and advertiser
model which considers various valuation distributions such as
uniform, exponential and lognormal.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the age of information and internet, users often visit
to different webpages for various goal, for example news
(www.thehindu.com), travel (www.irctc.co.in), etc. The web-
pages generate revenue from having ad display slots on
their page for advertisement. With increasing use of internet,
mobile internet and e-commerce platforms, the online ad
display market has grown significantly in last few years.
The total revenue generated from internet advertising in US
was $107.5 billion for 2018, [1]. The digital advertising
market in India was around $1.3 billion for 2018, [2]. This
is expected to grow further in coming years. Motivated
from these developments, in this paper we study an auction
mechanism for the online ad display market.
Various online content publishers have a large number of
webpages. The objective of these publishers is to maximize
their revenue via displaying ads. Publishers can enter into
contracts with advertisers to display ads in ad slots on
available on their webpages. Another way for publishers
to optimize their revenue from ads is by selling ad slots
using an auction mechanism, instead of fixed contracts with
advertisers. These auctions are conducted at Ad exchanges.
Examples of ad exchanges include Google’s Double Click,
OpenX, Yahoo!’s Right Media, etc.
We now briefly describe how online ad auctions work.
Consider a users arriving at a webpages. The publisher
approaches an ad exchange with ad display slots. Different
advertisers participate in an ad-slot auction held by the ad
Fig. 1. Online ad auction model
exchange. The publisher shares user information (from cook-
ies) with advertisers via the ad exchange. The advertisers that
match the user’s interests, participate in the auction and bid
(maximum willingness to pay) for the ad slot. This bid price
depends on their valuation for the ad slot. The auctioneer
runs the second price auction (SPA) mechanism, where ad
slot is allocated to advertiser with highest bid price and
the winner pays second highest bid price. This auction is
performed in a timescale of milliseconds. Each ad slot is
referred to, as an impression. Online ad auction model is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Large auctioneers (ad exchanges) may sell billions of
impressions in a day using the SPA mechanism. When the
user clicks on an ad slot, (s)he is sent to the advertiser’s
webpage. The advertiser’s valuation for the ad slot depends
on user’s click-through probability. The goal of the auction-
eer is to maximize its long term revenue thorough optimal
reserve pricing. Whereas the objective of advertisers is to
determine the bid price for each auction such that their long
term revenue is maximized. In [3], different models of ad
exchanges are discussed.
Often advertisers participate in auctions through inter-
mediaries called as demand side platforms (DSPs). This
may be because most of the advertisers have low budget
and might incur additional cost for maintaining their ser-
vices and designing optimal bid strategies. Instead, a DSP
represents the multiple advertisers in online ad auctions.
These advertisers can enter into contracts with DSP for
buying impressions and displaying their ads. Advertisers may
have targeting constraints, budget constraints or impression
constraints. Sometimes, advertisers might prefer some types
of ads over others. For example, one may have preference
for video ads over banner ads. Further, advertisers may have
different willingness to pay for different types of ads. A
DSP can have few hundreds of advertisers. A DSP needs
a policy to schedule these advertisers in online ad auctions,
and, a bidding algorithm that maximizes its total utility while
meeting the requirements of the advertisers. In online ad
auctions, there can be many DSPs participating in auctions.
This may influence the bid prices in auctions and affect
expected revenue of the auctioneer and the publishers.
In this paper we consider a single seller and buyer (DSP
or a advertiser) model. This is motivated from the ad auction
problem where an advertiser or a DSP participates in large
number of auctions. The SPA mechanism with a single buyer
and seller is called as posted price auction (PPA) mechanism.
In this mechanism, seller sets a reserve price on an item. The
buyer accepts the offer if the reserve price set by auctioneer
is lower than its own valuation, otherwise it rejects the offer.
Repeated auctions with posted price mechanism are referred
to repeated posted price auctions. This is a simplified model
of SPA mechanism.
A. Related work
We now discuss some relevant work on auctions, online
ad auctions and auction with intermediaries. A second price
auction mechanism is first introduced by Vickery in [4],
this is also referred to as Vickery auction. In SPA, there
is a seller and set of potential buyers. Each buyer values a
good differently and is willing to pay a different amount.
Each buyer knows their valuation for the good but does
not know the valuations of other buyers. The seller also
does not know the valuations of buyers. But the seller and
buyers know that their valuation is drawn from a probability
distribution function. This distribution is independent across
the buyers. This model is called as independent private
value (IPV) model. We further consider a symmetric buyer
valuation in which this probability distribution is identical.
The problem of optimal auction design for IPV model is
studied in [5]–[7]. Here, all buyers bid for a good. The
buyer with the highest bid price wins the auction and pays
the second highest bid price. In optimal auction design these
authors studied equilibrium bidding behavior. It is shown that
in equilibrium each buyer’s dominant strategy is to report
true valuation to seller. This is called as dominant strategy
incentive compatible (DSIC) auction. Further, the seller can
optimize revenue by setting an optimal reserve price for SPA
and it is independent of the number of buyers in SPA. For
more details on auctions, see [8].
Recently, repeated SPA has been studied in [9], [10] for
budget constrained online auction problem. Here, it is shown
that the optimal bidding behavior of buyer in equilibrium
is to shade their bid and set the bid price less than their
valuation. The buyers do not report true valuation and hence
this is not DSIC auction. The various issues in online ad
auction, and ad exchanges are mentioned in [3] and author
discusses the perspectives of the ad exchange, the advertiser,
the publisher, and, introduces the role of intermediaries
in the ad network. The role of reserve prices in auction
design using a field experiments are demonstrated in [11]. In
[12], dynamic reserve price based learning is introduced for
unknown value distribution function, in online ad auction,
and, incentive compatible constraints are also studied. A
variant of posted price auction model is investigated in [13]
and randomized auction model is studied.
In the domain of online ad display network, there are a
few works on ad auction with intermediaries (DSPs). This
study has become important due to resource constraints
put in by the advertisers while optimizing the online ad
auction target criteria. In [14], the author studies auctions
with intermediaries, where auctions are run at both the
seller and the intermediary. For auction at the seller, the
intermediaries are buyers and for auctions at intermediaries,
the advertisers are buyers. And, the equilibrium behavior is
studied. A single item auction with competing intermediary
is investigated in [15], [16]. A few variants of auctions with
intermediaries are studied in [17], [18] where the authors
discuss dynamic bidding strategies for budget constrained
advertisers. Dynamic pricing model for real time bidding in
online ad display is studied in [19]. Another direction of
research on auctions with intermediaries is studied in [20],
where authors introduce a multi-bidding concept.
None of the above models consider repeated posted price
auction with an intermediary, and the problem of advertiser-
scheduling faced by the intermediary.
B. Our contributions
In this paper, we study repeated posted price auction
mechanisms for the auction of homogeneous and hetero-
geneous items. We show that the optimal reserve price of
seller is fixed all round of auctions for homogeneous items
and the optimal reserve price of seller for heterogeneous
item is dynamic. Later, we use this insight to study an
online ad auction system with a DSP as an intermediary. We
provide optimization formulation as revenue maximization
and scheduling scheme for the advertisers at the DSP under
impression constraints and budget constraints. We provide
numerical examples for a single seller and advertiser model
for uniform, exponential and lognormal distribution on val-
uation of advertiser. We also illustrate numerical examples
with DSP model.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND MODEL
Consider an online ad auction system with a seller (ad
exchange) and a DSP. The seller has multiple units of K
types of items for sale and he auctions items sequentially1.
Suppose that there are T rounds of auctions. We index the
each round in the sequence by t and t = 1, 2, · · ·T. Ad-
vertisers participate in auctions through the DSP. The seller
uses posted price auction mechanism. The DSP schedules an
advertiser from its set of client advertisers in each round of
auction by accepting the price offered by the seller. The seller
knows the type of the item which is being autioned. The DSP
also has this information ( type of item being auctioned).
Users arrive at various websites sequentially. Different
websites have different types of ads slots available for
display2. Let pk be the probability that item of type k is
1Examples of different types of items include banner ad, video ad, etc.
The ad exchange can observe the types of ads that can be displayed at the
publisher’s site.
2Example: Youtube has video ad slots as well as display banner ad slots,
for the arriving user.
auctioned by seller in auction round t, and
∑K
k=1 pk = 1.
We assume that the type of items auctioned in each round are
independent of the other rounds. Let Xk,t be the indicator
random variable for round t, type k, with 1 ≤ k ≤ K and
1 ≤ t ≤ T. It takes value Xk,t = 1 if item of type k is
auctioned in round t; otherwise Xk,t = 0. Let qt be the
price set by seller in the round t. This price could depend
on type of item. We shall explicitly mention this dependence
of price qt on the type of item whenever necessary.
Suppose that the DSP has a set of N advertisers (clients)
denoted by N = {1, 2, · · · , N}. The advertisers are risk
neutral.
We assume that the seller does not know how much each
advertiser is willing to pay for different types of items. Let
v˜i,k,t be the value estimate of advertiser i for type k item in
round t, i.e., the maximum amount an advertiser is willing
to pay for an item. The seller’s uncertainty about the value
estimate of advertiser’s value is represented by a continuous
probability distribution function over a finite interval. Let
Fi,k be the probability distribution function for advertiser i
′s
valuation given that type k item is auctioned.
We now discuss posted price auction mechanism.
A. Posted price auction mechanism
In the standard posted price auction, there is a seller and
a buyer. The buyer’s value estimate v is unknown to the
seller, but he knows the probability distribution of the value
estimate, say, F over [v, v]3. The seller sets a reserve price,
say q and announces it to buyer. If v > q, the buyer accepts
the offer, otherwise the offer is rejected. The revenue of the
seller is q when the offer is accepted; it is 0 otherwise. The
payoff of the buyer is v−q when the offer accepted, and zero
otherwise. This strategy of the buyer is dominant strategy
incentive compatible (DSIC). From the seller’s perspective,
the objective is to optimize the revenue by setting optimal
reserve price. This price is the solution of following problem.
q∗ = argmax
q
q × Pr(v > q) = argmax
q
q(1− F (q)).
Repeated posted price auction (RPPA) mechanism: In
this case there are T rounds of auctions. And each round
follows the PPA mechanism. Now consider RPPA with a
single buyer. Let vt be the valuation of the buyer for round
t; it is drawn from probability distribution F independently
for each round. Let qt be the reserve price set by the seller in
round t. The buyer accepts the offer whenever vt ≥ qt and
rejects it otherwise. The expected revenue of a buyer over T
rounds of auctions is
RB,PPA = E
[
T∑
t=1
(vt − qt)1{qt<vt}
]
. (1)
The strategy of the buyer is DSIC. The seller’s expected
revenue over T rounds of auctions is
RS,PPA = E
[
T∑
t=1
qt1{qt<vt}
]
. (2)
3We need to assume that F is regular; see assumption 1 in [5], [12]
The objective of a seller is to set an optimal reserve price to
maximize (2).
B. DSP’s problem in a repeated posted price auction
We now consider the problem from the perspective of the
DSP. It has N advertisers (clients). Let vk,jt be the valuation
of advertiser jt = i for item of type k in auction t. Suppose
that qk,t be the price set by seller for type k item in round
t. DSP uses algorithm A to schedule one of the advertisers
in each round of auctions. Let {at}Tt=1 be the scheduled
sequence of advertisers according to A and at ∈ N . The
strategy of the DSP is DSIC. The expected revenue of the
DSP under algorithm A over T rounds of auctions is
RAD,PPA = E
A
[
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
(vk,at − qk,t)Xk,t1{(qk,t<vk,at )}
]
.
The expected revenue of the seller over T rounds of
auctions when DSP uses scheduling algorithm A is given
by
RAS,PPA = E
A
[
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
qk,tXk,t1{(qk,t<vk,at )}
]
.
The objective of DSP is to come up with a scheduling
algorithm to meet the criteria of the advertisers. The goal of
the seller is to set the optimal reserve price to maximize its
revenue.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyze the repeated posted price
auction mechanism with a single buyer (advertiser). We
derive some properties of RPPAs. Later we study RPPAs
involving a DSP.
A. Repeated posted price auction with single buyer
1) Homogeneous RPPA: In a homogeneous RPPA the
seller auctions identical items in all rounds. We begin with
an example; suppose that the buyer has fixed valuation v
for each PPA (round). The best response of the buyer to
the seller’s reserve price q, is to accept the offer if v > q,
and reject the offer otherwise. In each round of auctions, the
buyer follows this strategy. The total revenue of the buyer
over T rounds is (v − q)T 1{v>q}. The seller’s revenue is
qT 1{v>q}. In this example the buyer does not have incentive
to lie and accept the offer when v < q, because the payoff
is negative and the seller uses fixed reserve price for all
T auctions. This strategy of the buyer is called dominant
strategy incentive compatible (DSIC).
When the buyer’s valuation in each round is drawn from
probability distribution F over [v, v]. Each round is an
independent PPA; hence, the buyer’s strategy is to accept
the offer when current valuation is higher than the reserve
price of the seller. We make the following assumption on
probability distribution function F.
Definition 1 (Assumption): The distribution function F
with density f is regular and
(
v − 1−F (v)
f(v)
)
is strictly
increasing in v over [v, v].
We present the following proposition which is simple variant
of [5].
Proposition 1: In homogeneous RPPA, the seller sets a
single optimal reserve price q∗. The optimal revenue of the
seller over T rounds of auctions is
Tq∗Pr(v > q∗), (3)
and the optimal revenue of the buyer over T rounds of
auction is
TE[(v − q∗)1{v>q∗}]. (4)
Sketch of the proof: In repeated PPA, each round is PPA,
where seller can determine the optimal reserve price and it
has a unique solution because F is regular. Taking derivative
of q(1 − F (q)) with respect to q, and equating it to 0, we
get the optimal reserve price q∗. This is a solution of
q − 1− F (q)
f(q)
= 0. (5)
Buyer accepts PPA with probability Pr(v > q∗). Then,
we obtain optimal revenue of the seller from T rounds of
auctions as Tq∗Pr(v > q∗).
The buyer accepts an offer if value vt drawn from F in
auction t is higher than q∗. The identical items are auctioned
in round. Thus, the optimal revenue of the buyer is TE[(v−
q∗)1{v>q∗}].
2) Heterogeneous RPPA: Here, the seller has different
types of items for auction. In each round one type of item is
auctioned. Both the seller and buyer know the type of item
that is put in for auction. Our objective here is to show that,
in heterogeneous RPPA, the optimal strategy for a seller is
to have dynamic reserve price. To gain insight into this, let
us look at the following example.
Example: Consider a buyer and seller model with two
types of items to be auctioned by the seller. Suppose that
v1 and v2 are valuations of the buyer for these two types
of items; and v1 < v2. In auction t, the item of type i is
auctioned with prob. pi, and 0 < p1, p2 < 1, p1 + p2 = 1.
Now suppose that the seller sets a reserve price q1, for all
T round of auctions and q1 < v1 < v2. The revenue of the
seller over T rounds of auction under reserve price q1 is that
q1T. If seller sets reserve price higher than v2, then clearly
seller’s revenue is 0. If the seller sets the reserve price q2 for
all T and v1 < q2 < v2, then clearly there is no revenue of
the seller from type 1 items auction because reserve price is
higher than valuation but the seller can have revenue from
type 2 item. Thus the revenue of the seller is q2p2T. Now
suppose the seller has a dynamic reserve price such that,
when item of type i is auctioned, the reserve price set is qi,
and q1 < v1 < q2 < v2. Total revenue of the seller under
dynamic reserve price is (p1q1 + p2q2)T. Clearly, we have
(p1q1 + p2q2)T > q2p2T and (p1q1 + p2q2)T > q1T. Thus,
the seller uses dynamic reserve price for multi-type of items.
We now extend this to K-different types of items. Their
valuation is drawn from distribution Fk with density fk over
support [vk, vk] and vk−1 < vk.
Proposition 2: In heterogeneous RPPA, the optimal re-
serve price of the seller is dynamic. The optimal revenue
of a seller using dynamic reserve price over T rounds of
auctions is
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkq
∗
kPr(vt > q
∗
k).
Sketch of the proof: In auction t item of type k is
auctioned with probability pk,
∑K
k=1 pk = 1. The buyer has
valuation vt which is drawn from probability distribution Fk
over [vk, vk], given that type k item is auctioned. The optimal
reserve price set by the seller is q∗k which is solution of
qk− 1−Fk(qk)fk(qk) = 0. The seller’s revenue conditioned on type
k item is q∗kPrFk(v > q
∗
k). For K different type of items,
there are different optimal reserve prices. q∗ = [q∗1 , · · · , q∗K ]
is vector of optimal reserve prices for K type of items. The
optimal revenue from a auctions is
K∑
k=1
pkq
∗
kPrFk(vt > q
∗
k).
Thus total revenue over T rounds of auctions is
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkq
∗
kPrFk(vt > q
∗
k).
From the buyer’s perspective, the revenue from auc-
tion t conditioned on the auction of item of type k, is
EFk
[
(vt − q∗k)1{vt>q∗k}
]
Therefore, buyer’s total revenue
over T rounds is
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkEFk
[
(vt − q∗k)1{vt>q∗k}
]
.
B. Repeated posted price auction with a DSP
1) Homogeneous RPPA: There is a seller and a DSP. The
seller auctions identical items in each round of auctions.
DSP has N advertisers (clients). We first study the DSP’s
problem of advertiser scheduling, assuming perfect hindsight
of valuation for advertisers. vn,t is the valuation of advertiser
n and q∗ is the reserve price set by the seller. A naive
scheduling scheme based on highest valuation is described
in Algorithm. 1. The advertiser with the highest valuation in
round t is scheduled if it is higher than reserve price q∗. We
denote the allocation matrix as {xn,t}; xn,t = 0 if vn,t < q∗,
for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T and xn,t ∈ {0, 1} if vn,t ≥ q∗, for
n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T. If two or more advertisers share the
highest valuation, then one of them is scheduled randomly.
When the valuation of the advertiser vn,t = v for all
1 ≤ t ≤ T and all n ∈ N then advertisers are scheduled
uniform randomly. If v1,t > maxn∈N ,n6=1 vn,t, for all 1 ≤
t ≤ T, then according to Algorithm 1, DSP schedules only
advertiser 1. Algorithm 1 is not a suitable choice for the
DSP as it is not fair; some advertisers are disproportionately
favored. Advertisers often have impression constraints, i.e.,
they want to display their ad for a fixed number of times. To
account for this, we formulate the following problem under
Algorithm 1: DSP Scheduling algorithm for advertisers.
Input: The valuations of the advertisers, vn,t for all
n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T and seller’s reserve price q∗.
Output: Allocation matrix xn,t
for 1 ≤ t ≤ T do
vmax,t = maxn∈N vn,t
at = argmaxn∈N vn,t
xn,t = 1 if at = n, & vmax,t ≥ q∗
xn,t = 0 else
end
end
perfect hindsight of valuation of advertiser.
maxx G(x) =
∑T
t=1
∑N
n=1 [(vn,t − q∗)xn,t]
s.t.
∑N
n=1 xn,t ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T∑T
t=1
∑N
n=1 xn,t ≤ T∑T
t=1 xn,t ≥ ∆n for n ∈ N
xn,t = 0 if vn,t < q
∗, for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T
xn,t ∈ {0, 1} if vn,t ≥ q∗, for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
(P1)
Note that problem (P1) is a linear program with integer
constraints. The first constraint is that only an advertiser can
be scheduled, the second is a constraint on the total number
of auctions won by the DSP, the third constraint presents the
demand of impressions from the advertiser, ∆n, we assume
that ∆n < T. Fourth and fifth constraints are on the values
of allocation variable xn,t. The solution of the problem can
be approached using Lagrangian relaxation method. This
provides an upper bound on the solution of problem (P1),
[21, Chapter 10]. One can further relax the integer constraint;
this is the relaxed Lagrangian problem. Then, a subgradient
scheme can be used to update the Lagrangian variable.
We now suppose that the valuations of advertisers are
drawn from identical distribution F with density f and
follow the regularity property. Then, the seller can set optimal
reserve price q∗. Note that this reserve price is fixed for all
the rounds of auctions. The DSP sequentially schedules an
advertiser from the set of advertisers. It solves the following
optimization problem.
maxx
∑T
t=1
∑N
n=1 EF
[
(vn,t − q∗)1{vn,t>q∗}xn,t
]
s.t.
∑N
n=1 xn,t ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T
xn,t = 0 with prob. F (q
∗) for all n, t
xn,t ∈ {0, 1} with prob. 1− F (q∗) for all n, t
(P2)
In this optimization formulation, the expectation is w.r.t.
distribution F. The first constraint indicates that only one
advertiser can be scheduled in each round. The condition
in the second constraint implies that vn,t < q
∗ and hence
xn,t = 0. This occurs with prob. F (q
∗). The third condition
implies that vn,t ≥ q∗ and hence xn,t ∈ {0, 1}. This occurs
with prob. 1− F (q∗).
A simple strategy for the DSP would be to schedule the
advertiser with maximum valuation in the current round if
it is higher than optimal reserve price, otherwise reject the
offer of the seller. This allocation mechanism is randomized
because the valuation of each advertiser is drawn according
to F from [v, v]. This is described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: DSP’s randomized scheduling algorithm
for advertisers.
Input: Seller’s reserve price is q∗.
Output: Allocation matrix xn,t
for 1 ≤ t ≤ T do
Draw vn,t according to F from [v, v]
vmax,t = maxn∈N vn,t
at = argmaxn∈N vn,t
xn,t = 1 if at = n and vmax,t > q
∗
xn,t = 0 else
end
The probability of scheduling an advertiser in round t is
given by
Pr(max
n
vn,t > q
∗) = 1− Pr(max
n
vn,t ≤ q∗)
= 1−
N∏
n=1
Pr(vn,t ≤ q∗)
= 1− (F (q∗))N .
The expected number of impressions (auctions) won over
T rounds of auctions is T (1 − (F (q∗))N ). Hence, the
expected number of impressions assigned to an advertiser
is
T (1−(F (q∗))N )
N
.
The advertisers may also have different demands for
impressions. Thus, the DSP may need to consider the fol-
lowing impression constraint optimization problem, where
constraints are on expected impressions.
maxx
∑T
t=1
∑N
n=1 EF
[
(vn,t − q∗)1{vn,t>q∗}xn,t
]
s.t.
∑N
n=1 xn,t ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T
EF
[∑T
t=1 1{vn,t>q∗}xn,t
]
≥ ∆n for n ∈ N
xn,t = 0 with prob. F (q
∗) for all n, t
xn,t ∈ {0, 1} with prob. 1− F (q∗) for all n, t.
(P3)
Here, second condition gives the expected demand con-
straints from advertisers. Again, solution to problem (P3)
can be obtained using Lagrangian relaxation approach.
2) Heterogeneous RPPA: We now analyze the DSP’s
advertiser scheduling problem for a heterogeneous RPPA. At
the beginning of each round, the DSP and seller know the
type of item that is put in for auction. Using this information,
the seller sets an optimal reserve price and it is dependent
on type of item.
We assume that DSP has perfect hindsight of valuation
for advertisers. Let vn,k,t be the valuation of advertiser n if
item of type k is auctioned in round t. Let q∗k be the optimal
reserve price for type k item, set by the seller. As before,
we first study a naive scheduling scheme based on highest
valuation; this is given in Algorithm. 3. The advertiser with
the highest valuation in round t is scheduled if its valuation
is higher than reserve price q∗k. If two or more advertisers
share the highest valuation, then one of them is scheduled
Algorithm 3: DSP Scheduling algorithm of heteroge-
neous items for advertisers.
Input: The valuations of the advertisers, vn,k,t for all
n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T. and {bt}Tt=1
Output: Allocation matrix xn,t
for 1 ≤ t ≤ T do
Type of item for auction is obsereved, i.e., k
vmax,t = maxn∈N vn,k,t
at = argmaxn∈N vn,t
Seller sets the optimal reserve price bt = q
∗
k
xn,t = 1 if at = n, & vmax,t ≥ bt
xn,t = 0 else
end
end
randomly. We use {bt}Tt=1 to denote the sequence of the type
of item auctioned; bt ∈ {q∗1 , · · · q∗K}.
The advertisers can have constraints on number of im-
pressions. Also, each advertiser may prefer different types
of items with different frequency. Hence, the DSP considers
the following optimization formulation.
maxx
∑T
t=1
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=1
[
(vn,k,t − bt)xn,t
]
s.t.
∑N
n=1 xn,t ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T∑T
t=1 1{vn,k,t>q∗k}xn,t ≥ yn,k for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T∑T
t=1 xn,t ≥ ∆n for n ∈ N
xn,t = 0 if vn,k,t < bt, for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T
xn,t ∈ {0, 1} if vn,k,t ≥ bt, for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
(P4)
Note that all constraints in problem (P4) are similar to
earlier problem (P1), except the second constraint which in-
dicates demands of advertisers for the number of impressions
for different types of items.
We next study heterogeneous RPPA when valuation of the
advertisers is a realization drawn from fixed distributions.
An item of type k is auctioned in slot t with probability
pk. The seller and DSP has knowledge of type of items
at the beginning of every auction. The DSP can schedule
advertisers based on the highest valuation. The probability
of scheduling an advertiser in round t given that type k item
is auctioned, is given by
Pr(max
n
vn,k,t > q
∗
k | type k item ) = 1− (Fk(q∗k))N .
The expected number of impressions (auctions) won over T
rounds of auctions are T
∑K
k=1 pk(1 − (Fk(q∗k))N ). Hence,
the expected number of impressions assigned to an advertiser
are
T
∑K
k=1
pk(1−(Fk(q
∗
k))
N )
N
.
The advertisers may have an expectation constraint on the
number on impressions. In this case the DSP considers the
following impression constraint optimization problem.
maxx
[∑T
t=1
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=1 pkEFk
[
(vn,k,t − q
∗
k)1{vn,k,t>q∗k}xn,t
]]
s.t.
∑N
n=1 xn,t ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T
EFk
[∑T
t=1 1{vn,k,t>q∗k}xn,t
]
= yn,k for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T∑T
t=1
∑K
k=1 EFk
[
1{vn,k,t>q∗k}xn,t
]
≥ ∆n for n ∈ N
xn,t = 0 with prob.
∑K
k=1 pkFk(q
∗
k) for all n, t
xn,t ∈ {0, 1} with prob. 1−
∑K
k=1 pkFk(q
∗
k)) for all n, t.
(P5)
Here, conditioned on type of item k is auctioned in round
t, xn,t = 0 with prob. Fk(q
∗
k). Hence unconditional this,
xn,t = 0 with prob.
∑K
k=1 pkFk(q
∗
k). Similarly, xn,t ∈ {0, 1}
with prob. 1−∑Kk=1 pkFk(q∗k).
IV. BUDGET CONSTRAINED ADVERTISERS
Let us now look at the budget management strategy for
advertiser, i.e., buyer’s perspective in posted price auction.
Here, the seller sets a fixed reserve price, say q. To gain
insight into this, consider a single advertiser and seller model
with posted price mechanism. Let v be the fixed valuation of
advertiser with total budget B and he is interacting with the
seller over T rounds. Let v > q. If total budget B > Tq, then
the advertiser can win all impressions. Suppose that B < Tq,
the advertiser can win a fraction M of impressions from T,
i.e., M = B
q
. A simple strategy of the advertiser could be to
buy the first M impressions out of T. But, this may not be
suitable for an advertiser who wants to display ads uniformly
over T auctions. Hence, the advertiser uses a probabilistic
throttling scheme in which he participates in each round of
auctions with probability ξ, and 0 < ξ < M
T
< 1. This
simple scenario suggests that an advertiser with tight budget
would prefer to participate in auctions selectively.
Now consider a DSP with clients who are budget con-
strained. Let us now look at the problem of budget-
constrained-advertiser scheduling at the DSP in a homo-
geneous RPPA. Also, the advertisers have distinct budget
constraints. Let Bn be the budget of advertiser n. For
simplicity assume that all advertisers have the same valuation
v and this is higher than seller’s reserve price q. And,∑N
n=1Bn ≤ Tq. The DSP can use probabilistic throttling
scheme in which it schedules advertiser n in each round
with probability 0 < ξn <
Bi
q
< 1, and
∑N
n=1 ξn = 1.
For the case where valuation changes for every round,
the DSP considers following budget constrained optimization
problem under perfect hindsight of valuation of advertisers.
maxx
∑T
t=1
∑N
n=1 [(vn,t − q∗)xn,t]
s.t.
∑N
n=1 xn,t ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T∑T
t=1 xn,t ≤ Bnq∗ for n ∈ N
xn,t = 0 if vn,t < q
∗, for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T
xn,t ∈ {0, 1} if vn,t ≥ q∗, for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
(P6)
Note that in the above formulation, Bn is budget of
advertiser n, and the second constraint indicates the budget
constraint of that advertiser.
Next, suppose that the valuations of advertisers are drawn
from identical distribution F with density f and seller sets
the optimal reserve price q∗. The DSP sequentially sched-
ules budget constrained advertisers by solving the following
optimization problem.
maxx EF
[∑T
t=1
∑N
n=1
[
(vn,t − q∗)1{vn,t>q∗}xn,t
]]
s.t.
∑N
n=1 xn,t ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T
EF
[∑T
t=1 1{vn,t>q∗}xn,t
]
≤ Bn
q∗
for n ∈ N
xn,t = 0 with prob. F (q
∗) for all n, t
xn,t ∈ {0, 1} with prob. 1− F (q∗) for all n, t
(P7)
Second constraint indicates that the expected budget con-
straint on each advertiser.
In heterogeneous RPPA, single seller and an advertiser
problem is non trivial. The advertiser may have preferences
for different type of items. Hence he would like balance bud-
get for distinct items. This is again constrained optimization
problem. Finally, we consider DSP with budget constrained
advertisers and DSP solves the following budget constrained
optimization problem.
maxx
∑T
t=1
∑K
k=1 pk
∑N
n=1 EFk
[
(vn,k,t − q
∗
k)1{vn,k,t>q∗k}xn,t
]
s.t.
∑N
n=1 xn,t ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T
EFk
[∑T
t=1 1{vn,k,t>q∗k}xn,t
]
≥ yn,k for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T∑T
t=1
∑K
k=1 pkEFk
[
q∗k1{vn,k,t>q∗k}xn,t
]
≤ Bn for n ∈ N
xn,t = 0 with prob.
∑K
k=1 pkF (q
∗
k) for all n, t
xn,t ∈ {0, 1} with prob.
∑K
k=1 pk(1 − F (q
∗
k)) for all n, t.
(P8)
We note that in above formulation, second constraint
indicated different demands for different type of items and
the third constraint represent the expected budget constraint.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first provide numerical examples for a
single seller and single buyer model. We obtain the optimal
reserve price when the valuation of the buyer is a random
variable with uniform , exponential, and lognormal distribu-
tion. Also, we compute the expected revenue of the buyers
over T rounds of auctions. Next we consider a numerical
example for the DSP under impression constraints. Finally,
we provide simulations for a DSP with multiple budget
constraint advertisers.
• Uniform distribution U [v, v], then cdf is
F (v) =

0 if v < v
v−v
v−v if v ∈ [v, v)
1 if v > v.
and pdf is
f(v) =
{
1
v−v if v ∈ [v, v]
0 Otherwise
Then using eqn. (5), we obtain
v −
1− v−v
v−v
1
v−v
= 0.
and hence we can have optimal reserve price q∗ = v2 .
In the example U [0, 1], optimal reserve price 1/2. From
Eqn. (3) and (4), the expected revenue of a seller is T4
and expected revenue of a buyer is T8 .
• Exponential distribution Exp[λ], then cdf is
F (v) = 1− e−λv for v ∈ [0,∞).
and pdf is
f(v) = λe−λv
Then using eqn. (5), we obtain
v − 1− (1− e
−λv)
λe−λv
= 0.
and hence we can have optimal reserve price v∗ = 1
λ
.
Then
Pr(v∗ >
1
λ
) = 1− Pr(v∗ ≤ 1
λ
)
= 1−
(
1− e−λ× 1λ
)
= 1− 1 + e−1 = e−1
Thus the seller’s revenue is T/λe. Buyers expected
revenue is
T
∫ ∞
1/λ
(
x− 1
λ
)
λe
−λx
dx =
T
λe
.
Note that mean of exponential random variable is µ =
1
λ
. This suggest that the higher the mean implies higher
expected revenue for both buyer and seller.
• Lognormal distribution: The cdf with mean µ and
variance σ is
F (v) = Φ
(
ln v − µ
σ
)
,
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution (i.e. N(0, 1)). The proba-
bility density function is
f(v) =
1
vσ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (ln v − µ)
2
2σ2
)
.
Then using eqn. (5), we get
v − 1− Φ
(
ln v−µ
σ
)
1
vσ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (ln v−µ)2
2σ2
) = 0.
After further simplification we get
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (ln v − µ)
2
2σ2
)
− 1 + Φ
(
ln v − µ
σ
)
= 0.
Analytical solution of this equation is difficult to obtain.
We compute the solution using numerical methods
and get the optimal reserve price q∗. Buyers expected
revenue is
T
∫ ∞
q∗
(v − q∗) 1
σv
√
2pi
exp
(
− (ln v − µ)
2
2σ2
)
dv.
Seller’s expected revenue is
Tq
∗
(
1− Φ
(
ln v − µ
σ
))
.
It is difficult to write the above expressions in closed
form. Hence, we provide results through numerical
TABLE I
THE OPTIMAL RESERVE PRICE, EXPECTED REVENUE OF SELLER
(SELLER R) AND EXPECTED REVENUE OF BUYER (BUYER R) FOR
DIFFERENT µ.
µ σ q∗ Seller R Buyer R
0 1 1.4 0.5156T 0.7512T
0.25 1 1.8 0.8380T 0.9175T
0.5 1 2.3 1.23T 1.18T
2 1 10.1 9.61T 5.37T
methods, in Table I. From Table I observe that as
mean µ increases, the optimal reserve price of the seller
increases. This means, the sellers expected revenue also
increases. Further, the expected revenue of buyer also
increases with µ.
A. DSP Problem
We present numerical example for RPPA with a DSP, and
use the naive scheduling scheme (see Algorithm 1) when
the valuations of advertisers are known in hindsight. We
use following parameters: number of auctions T = 10000,
N = 5. We use fixed valuation vn,t and generate [[vn,t]]
using lognormal distribution with mean µ = 0 and variance
σ = 1. For different reserve prices q, we provide simula-
tions to illustrate effect of reserve price on the expected
revenue of seller (
∑
T
t=1 q1{maxn vn,t>q}
T
), the expected revenue
of buyers (
∑
T
t=1
(vn,t−q)xn,t
T
),and number of impressions win
(
∑T
t=1 xn,t). The results are summarized in the tables below
The above numerical examples suggests that, setting of
Reserve price q q = 1 q = 2 q = 4
Seller’s revenue 0.9727 1.5104 1.3812
q = 1 q=2 q=4
Adv. Impressions Revenue Imp. Rev Imp. Rev.
1 2004 0.6449 1551 0.4651 707 0.2506
2 1906 0.5951 1484 0.4226 683 0.2137
3 1882 0.5759 1457 0.4060 643 0.2050
4 1950 0.6125 1517 0.4363 735 0.2221
5 1985 0.6239 1543 0.4454 685 0.2316
optimal reserve price by the seller impacts its expected
revenue. High reserve price may lead to low revenue. And,
too low reserve price also leads to low revenue. But by setting
optimal reserve price, a seller can optimize its revenue. As
reserve price of seller increases, the number of impressions
won by DSP for advertiser decreases and also the expected
revenue of advertisers decreases.
More simulation results are provided in [22].
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has studied repeated posted price auction
(RPPA) in online advertising. We considered the problem of
a single seller and an advertiser where items are auctioned
sequentially. This was studied for both homogeneous and
heterogeneous items. We also computed the optimal reserve
price for seller under homogeneous items. We have shown
that for heterogeneous items, the seller’s optimal reserve
price is dynamic. Later, we studied an RPPA involving
a DSP, and devised a simple scheduling scheme under
assumption of hindsight on valuation for repeated auctions.
We also formulated the advertiser scheduling problem of
the DSP when the advertisers have impression and budget
constraints. This was again done for both homogeneous and
heterogeneous items. Finally, we presented some numerical
examples for a single seller and advertiser model with
PPA and considered various valuation distributions such
as uniform, exponential and lognormal. We also provided
numerical examples for a single seller and DSP model with
a naive scheduling scheme based on valuation of advertisers.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Numerical Example and Extension of Table I
In this, we provide a numerical example of a single seller
and advertiser model with lognormal distribution function for
different values of variance σ. This is given in Table II.
TABLE II
THE OPTIMAL RESERVE PRICE, EXPECTED REVENUE OF SELLER
(SELLER R) AND EXPECTED REVENUE OF BUYER (BUYER R) FOR
DIFFERENT σ.
µ σ q∗ Seller R Buyer R
0 0.25 0.76 0.07T 0.28T
0 0.5 0.78 0.2T 0.41T
0 1 1.36 0.5T 0.73T
0 2 23.2 10.05T 3.57T
We observe that as variance σ increases, expected revenue
of the seller and advertiser increases. Further, the seller’s
expected revenue increase is significantly higher because the
reserve price q∗ increase is steep.
B. Numerical Example of DSP Problem
We here present additional numerical examples with a
single seller and DSP problem. We use the same parame-
ters as in Section V-A. Here, we study a round-robin and
randomized policy for scheduling of advertiser.
In round-robin (RR) policy, DSP selects an advertisers
are selected in round-robin fashion, and are scheduled for
participation in auction if their valuation is higher than the
reserve price. Otherwise they are not scheduled. Numerical
results are presented in Table III and IV. Since, in some
auctions no advertiser is scheduled, advertisers win fewer
number of impressions as compared to given in Sec. V-A.
Here, as the reserve price increases, the expected revenue of
the seller and of the advertisers decreases.
TABLE III
THE SELLER’S REVENUE FOR DIFFERENT RESERVE PRICE WHEN DSP
USES ROUND ROBIN POLICY
Reserve price q q = 1 q = 2 q = 4
Seller’s revenue 0.502 0.4954 0.3324
TABLE IV
ADVERTISER’S REVENUE FOR DIFFERENT RESERVE PRICE WHEN DSP
USES ROUND ROBIN POLICY
q = 1 q=2 q=4
Adv. Impressions Revenue Imp. Rev. Imp. Rev.
1 993 0.1713 499 0.1011 164 0.0440
2 1016 0.1813 483 0.1104 165 0.0524
3 994 0.1748 482 0.1062 154 0.0504
4 1003 0.1787 514 0.1073 175 0.0481
5 1014 0.1825 499 0.1115 173 0.0513
We now study a randomized policy. In this policy, DSP
selects advertisers in uniform random fashion. These ran-
domly selected advertisers are scheduled for participation in
auctions if their valuation is higher than the seller’s reserve
price q. Numerical examples with different reserve price
values are given in Table V and VI. In this policy, if DSP
selects an advertiser whose valuation is smaller than the
reserve price, no advertiser is scheduled in auction. Observe
that as reserve price increases, expected revenues of the seller
and the advertisers decrease.
TABLE V
THE SELLER’S REVENUE FOR DIFFERENT RESERVE PRICE WHEN DSP
USES UNIFORM RANDOMIZED POLICY
Reserve price q q = 1 q = 2 q = 4
Seller’s revenue 0.493 0.482 0.3364
TABLE VI
ADVERTISER’S REVENUE FOR DIFFERENT RESERVE PRICE WHEN DSP
USES UNIFORM RANDOMIZED POLICY
q = 1 q=2 q=4
Adv. Impressions Revenue Imp. Rev Imp. Rev.
1 961 0.183 489 0.1027 160 0.0528
2 1017 0.18 459 0.0846 189 0.0543
3 960 0.17 476 0.1072 134 0.0432
4 948 0.16 480 0.1033 192 0.0577
5 1042 0.185 506 0.1054 166 0.0442
The performance of this policy is very similar to round
robin policy In both these policies, in some fraction of
auctions, selected advertisers are not scheduled because their
valuation is lower than the reserve price.
It is possible that one can modify these policies in the
following manner. The set of advertisers is selected in auction
based on their valuation, i.e., if their valuation is higher than
reserve price. Later, round robin or randomized policy can be
used to select and schedule one advertiser for each round of
auction. Now, it can be expected that the DSP wins more
number of impressions for advertisers. This increases the
expected revenue of both the seller and the advertisers.
C. Impression constraint advertisers at DSP
Using Lagrangian relaxation approach for problem (P1),
we obtain
L(x, λ) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
(vn,t − q)xn,t +
N∑
n=1
λn
(
T∑
t=1
xn,t −∆n
)
.
Here, λn ≥ 0 is Lagrangian variable associated with demand
of advertiser n. After simplification, we have
L(x, λ) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
(vn,t + λn − q)xn,t −
N∑
n=1
λn∆n.
We represent the additional constraint as follows.
C =
{
x
∣∣∣∣ N∑
n=1
xn,t ≤ 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T ;
xn,t ∈ {0, 1} for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T} .
We have following inequality Opt(P1) ≤ maxx∈C L(x, λ)
and Let
h(λ) = max
x∈C
L(x, λ)
= max
x∈C
[
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
(vn,t + λn − q)xn,t
]
−
N∑
n=1
λn∆n.
Moreover DSP may schedule nth advertiser if vn,t+λn−q ≥
0, otherwise DSP does not that advertiser. This is because,
for not scheduling, the payoff is zero instead of negative. This
gives us an intuition that, higher demand of nth advertiser
may correspond to higher values of λn. This boosts the
valuation to (vn,t + λn). This introduces aggressive bidding
behavior of advertisers with high demand of impressions and
hence these advertisers are scheduled more frequently than
others.
Note that this is a linear program with integer constraints.
Thus, it is difficult to solve. An approach is to further relax
the integer constraints and consider 0 ≤ xn,t ≤ 1. Intro-
duction of this relaxation increases the size of constraints.
Hence, we can have
C˜ =
{
x
∣∣∣∣ N∑
n=1
xn,t ≤ 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T ;
0 ≤ xn,t ≤ 1 for n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T , } .
and C ⊂ C˜. Then relaxed Lagrangian problem is
hR(λ) = max
x∈C˜
L(x, λ)
= max
x∈C˜
[
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
(vn,t + λn − q)xn,t
]
−
N∑
n=1
λn∆n.
Also, h(λ) ≤ hR(λ). Then, Lagrangian dual of the relaxation
of problem (P1) is given by
hRLD = min
λ≥0
hR(λ).
Note that hR(λ) is piece-wise linear and convex in λ. Then
subgradient algorithm for λ is as follows.
λk+1n = max
{
0, λkn + s
k
(
T∑
t=1
xn,t(λ
k)−∆n
)}
,
for n = 1, 2, · · · , N. Here, sk is step sizes. The convergence
of subgradient algorithm is obtained for suitably selected
step sizes. More detail on step size selection is given in [21,
Chapter 10, page no. 502].
1) Numerical examples: We next present few numerical
examples with simple heuristic greedy algorithms. In the
first example, we consider the valuation of all advertisers
to be equal and it is constant for all rounds of auctions.
Moreover, this valuation is higher than reserve price q. We
use the following parameters. v = 2.5, q = 1, N =
5 and T = 10000 and demand for impressions ∆ =
[400, 800, 4800, 400, 1600]. Define ξn =
∆n∑
N
n=1
∆n
. Then
ξ = [0.05, 0.1, 0.6, 0.05, 0.2]. We use a greedy algorithm in
TABLE VII
ADVERTISER’S REVENUE WITH FIXED VALUATION v = 2.5, q = 1 AND
IMPRESSION DEMAND
q = 1
Adv. Impressions Revenue
1 485 0.07
2 984 0.15
3 6002 0.91
4 498 0.07
5 2031 0.3
which an advertiser is selected according to their demand,
i.e., advertiser n is selected with prob. ξn. Table VII shows
the expected revenue of seller and the number of impressions
for different advertisers. Expected revenue of the seller is
1. Notice that a simple greedy algorithm at DSP meets the
demands of all advertisers.
TABLE VIII
ADVERTISER’S REVENUE WITH FIXED VALUATION ACCORDING TO
LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION AND IMPRESSION DEMAND
q = 1
Adv. Impressions Revenue
1 260 0.04
2 519 0.09
3 2981 0.52
4 235 0.04
5 1000 0.17
In second numerical example, the valuation of advertisers
is fixed and it is drawn according to lognormal distribution
function. In this example, DSP selects advertiser n with prob.
ξn and it is scheduled in auction t if vn,t > q. Otherwise no
advertiser is scheduled in auction t. The expected revenue of
advertisers and number of impressions is given in Table VIII.
The seller’s expected revenue is 0.5. Observe that using this
policy, the impression demands of some advertisers are not
fulfilled.
TABLE IX
ADVERTISER’S REVENUE WITH FIXED VALUATION ACCORDING TO
LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION AND IMPRESSION DEMAND:
EXAMPLE-3
q = 1
Adv. Impressions Revenue
1 1024 0.19
2 1607 0.28
3 3749 0.64
4 1036 0.19
5 2317 0.40
In the third example we consider another variant of the
preceding algorithm. Here, advertisers with valuation above
the reserve price are selected. Then, DSP schedules adver-
tisers according to their demand of impressions. The results
are shown in Table IX. Now observe that the impression
demand of all advertisers is fulfilled, except advertiser 3
which is very higher than other advertisers. This simple
variation performs better than the preceding algorithm. Thus,
the expected revenue of advertisers is higher and the expected
revenue of a seller is 0.97.
TABLE X
ADVERTISER’S REVENUE WITH FIXED VALUATION ACCORDING TO
LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION AND IMPRESSION DEMAND:
EXAMPLE-4
q = 1
Adv. Impressions Revenue
1 814 0.1557
2 1177 0.1972
3 5046 0.8235
4 810 0.1534
5 1931 0.3342
In our final numerical example, we use the insight de-
veloped from Lagrangian relaxation of the problem. If the
demand of advertiser is high, then the valuation of that
advertiser is boosted by having higher Lagrangian multiplier.
Motivated from this, in this example the valuation of ad-
vertiser 3 is increase marginally for all auctions by adding
λ3 = 0.25 and for other advertisers λn = 0, n 6= 3. Here,
we use the algorithm studied in example 3. This is given
in Table X. The seller’s expected revenue is 0.98. Note that
using this simple variation, DSP can fulfill the impression
demand of all advertisers.
